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I.

BACKGROUND
Systemic Risk can be generally defined as “the risk of a major and rapid

disruption in one or more of the core functions of the financial system caused by the
initial failure of one or more financial firms or a segment of the financial system. The
potential for a shock to a specific financial firm transforming into an aggregate shock that
affects the entire financial system is one useful way of thinking about systemic risk.”1
Systemic risk is at its worst when unexpected shocks to the market happen due to
unforeseen events, and when overlapping fund investment managers must react
simultaneously to these shocks, the detriment to the system extends far beyond what
anyone can comfortably predict.2 Large funds, or common actions in the market by a
group of funds, may cause changes in asset prices that are completely unreflective of
market fundamentals.3 Furthermore, forced selling of assets may cause sharp price
declines that have a domino or ripple effect upon other financial firms that are cyclical in
nature.4

1

LUDWIG CHINCARINI, THE CRISIS OF CROWDING, QUANT COPYCATS, UGLY MODELS, AND THE NEW
CRASH NORMAL 2 (Bloomberg Press, 1st ed. 2012) (“This permeative effect is the root notion of the
concept of financial contagion.”).
2
LLOYD DIXON ET AL., HEDGE FUNDS AND SYSTEMIC RISK, at xvi, Monograph (The Rand Corporation
2012) (“[Unforeseen events in 2008] created pressures on hedge funds to sell assets during the peak of the
financial crisis, potentially contributing to the rapid decline in asset prices. Rapid declines in asset prices
can create self-reinforcing cycles of margin calls, additional asset liquidations, and further prices
declines.”); see DAVID P. BELMONT, MANAGING HEDGE FUND RISK AND FINANCING: ADAPTING TO A NEW
ERA, at 93 (John Wiley & Sons 2011).
3
DIXON ET AL., at 5.
4
Id.; Amir Khandani & Lo, Andrew, What Happened to the Quants In August 2007? Evidence From
Factors and Transactions Data, THE JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL MARKETS 2 (2008).

1

This note does not argue that mandatory Regulatory 13(f) portfolio disclosure
protects each funds’ investors and the fund’s individual trading strategy, but instead,
argues the opposite: that the commonality of investment strategies is widespread, and the
current disclosure regime gives ample opportunity to increase the number of investors
using the same strategies. When successful investment managers file public Form 13Fs,
their success can be copied by other managers and implemented in the market.5 This
copycat strategy creates redundant portfolio holdings in the system, and the overlap of
portfolio holdings only serves to exacerbate systemic risk.6
Part II of this note explains the applicability and relevance of Form 13F, and
which investment managers must file. Part III details background information on types
of quantitative investment strategies popular in the investment management community.
Part IV Explains the risks to the system that are caused when institutional managers must
disclose. Part V explains how those individual and singular risks can combine to form
systemic catastrophe. Part VI offers enhanced confidential treatment of disclosures as a
remedy for the issues at hand.

II.

REGULATION 13(F) AND FORM 13(F) DISCLOSURES
1.

Definitions/Applicability/Relevance

5

See discussion infra, Part IV.
DIXON ET AL., supra note 2, at xxiii (“[E]ven if no one hedge fund may be large enough to pose a systemic
risk to the financial system, negative shocks can cause hedge funds as a group to unwind their positions at
the same time, with ramifications cascading through the economy.”).
6
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Rule 13(f)-1 outlines the necessary disclosure obligations of investment managers
above a certain dollar threshold.7 These disclosures must be filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission through the Form 13F on a quarterly basis.8 At the close of each
calendar quarter, filers have a permissible forty-five day window in which to timely file
the Form 13F.9 The filings must include information about the specifics of the equities
holdings and the type of discretion the managers have over investment decisions.10
Investment managers that have discretionary decision making authority pertaining to
specific investment decisions are the reporting individuals, qualified by those with
authority over $100 million or more in equity securities holdings.11 The regulation does
not explicitly define the institutions that are subject to the regulation, but instead applies
to the broad variety of investment managers that meet the simple criteria.12 While the 13F
reports are made public, the next section details the confidential treatment that can be
afforded to managers that qualify, with particular respect to investment managers in the
hedge fund context.13

A.

Hedge Funds

7

17 C.F.R. § 204.13f-(1)(a)(1)
Id.
9
17 C.F.R. § 204.13f-(1)(c)
10
Thomas P. Lemke & Gerald T. Lins, Disclosure of Equity Holdings by Institutional Investment
Managers: An Analysis of Section 13 (F) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 43 BUS. LAW. 93, 94
(1987).
11
17 C.F.R. § 204.13f-(1)(b); Lemke & Lins, supra note 10 at 103 (explaining precisely the definition of
discretionary decision making).
12
Lemke & Lins, supra note 10, at 93-94 (“This reporting threshold encompasses many types of
institutional managers such as banks, investment companies, pension funds, insurance companies, and
brokerage houses.”).
13
13F filings can be found at the SEC’s Edgar Database website, available at
https://www.sec.gov/edgar/searchedgar/companysearch.html (last visited March 27, 2016).
8
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It is difficult to precisely define what a hedge fund is because the term covers a
vast array of different investment vehicles.14 Hedge funds comprise a class of Alternative
Investment vehicles, with distinct limitations on the qualifications and number of
investors, as well as how those investors can be solicited and retained.15 Similarly, most
hedge funds are characterized by limitations on investor redemptions, return benchmarks
correlated to management fees, and broad management discretion over investment
decision.16 By 2010, the US Government Accountability Office reported the number of
hedge funds to be approximately 9,500 with $2.4 trillion in assets under management.17
Outside of these criteria, hedge funds can exercise broad leeway in the investment
strategies and asset classes they are permitted to employ.18 This complete freedom in
investment discretion distinguishes hedge funds from other types of asset management
vehicles, and many hedge funds are often significant investors in certain markets and
active traders in many markets.19 The strategies that generally characterize hedge funds
are the use of both “long” and “short” positions, the employment of leverage, the use of
derivative instruments, and the limited disclosure of proprietary strategies.20 However,

14

RICHARD BOOKSTABER, A DEMON OF OUR OWN DESIGN: MARKETS, HEDGE FUNDS, AND THE PERILS OF
FINANCIAL INNOVATION 243-249 (John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1st ed. 2007).
15
DIXON ET AL., supra note 2, at xiv.
16
Id.; See also ANDREW LO, HEDGE FUNDS at 3 (John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1st ed. 2012) (explaining the
enormous flexibility that managers have in pursuing alpha).
17
LO, supra note 16, at 2.
18
BOOKSTABER, supra note 14, at 243; see also LO, supra note 15, at 3.
19
DIXON ET AL., supra note 2, at 5; Itzhak Ben-David et al., The Behavior of Hedge Funds During Liquidity
Crises at 5 (Ohio State University, Charles A Dice Center for Research in Financial Economics, 2010).
David Easley et al., Opaque Trading, Disclosure, and Asset Prices: Implications for Hedge Fund
Regulation, 27 REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES 1190 (2014).
20
DIXON ET AL., supra note 2, at xiv.
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these attributes are what distinguish hedge funds from more regulated managers such as
Mutual Funds, Index Funds and Pension Funds.21

1.

Confidentiality Provisions

Investment managers can request confidential status on their Form 13F upon
filing.22 This confidential status is permitted pursuant to Exchange Act Rule 24b-2.23 The
Form 13F provides the exact specifics of what details and explanations must be filed,
along with the nine criteria that can permissibly be granted confidential status.24 While
the instructions and qualifications are seemingly simple and explicit, investment
managers have often decried that the burden imposed by the SEC is too high and that the
standards are almost impossible to meet.25 Investment managers are vocal in the harm
that public disclosure can cause to the industry, the proprietariness of the investment
strategies employed, and the resulting danger to the system; with one prominent manager
going to far as to say disclosure is “akin to asking Coca-Cola to disclose their secret
formula.”26 The predominant view is that investment strategies constitute trade secrets
and proprietary intellectual property.27 When disclosed, the astute investor can discern

21

Id.
Form 13F.
23
Edward Pekarek, Hogging the Hedge, Bulldog’s 13F Theory May Not Be So Lucky, 12 FORDHAM J.
CORP. & FIN. L. 1079 (2007).
24
Form 13F.
25
James Robertson, Hedge Funds and Public Disclosure Requirements, Is the SEC Telling Secrets?, 8 NE.
L.J. 787, at (2008).
26
Hedge Fund Regulation, Fund Managers Panel, Hearing Before the H. Oversight and Government
Reform Comm., 110th Cong. 2 (November 13, 2008), (statement of Clifford Asness, at 47 min).
27
Pekarek, supra note 23, at; accord Robertson, supra note 25, at; See also, Erin Martin,
The Intersection Between Finance and Intellectual Property: Trade Secrets, Hedge Funds, and Section
13(F) of the Exchange Act, 53 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 575 (2008); LO at 2.
22
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the nature of the strategy by examining the portfolio holdings, and reverse engineer those
strategies to create copycat or “clone” funds.28

III.

QUANTITATIVE EQUITY STRATEGIES DETAILED
Form 13(f) applies specifically to “discretionary investment managers.”

Discretionary investment managers are a diverse group.29 In general, discretionary
investment managers engage in proprietary trading and have discretionary decision
making powers based on history, intuition, strategy, training and personal experience. 30
That discretion extends to the types of strategies detailed in the next section. The focus of
the discussion in this note is centered around Quantitative based investment strategies, or
those that implement Quantitative Finance Theory to structure investments (colloquially
referred to as “Quant” for short). Quant trading strategies implement diverse theories
across academic disciplines, as well as proprietary combinations of various academia and
traditional trading strategies, to build explicit trading rules and parameters to implement
systematically across markets.31

28

See discussion infra, part IV.
See supra note 11.
30
Lasse Heje Pedersen, When Everyone Runs for the Exit, at 184 (National Bureau of Economic Research
2009).
31
Id. (“Quants define the trading rules explicitly and build systems that implement them systematically.
They try to develop a small edge on each of many small diversified trades using sophisticated processing of
ideas that cannot be easily processed using non-quantitative methods. To do this, they use tools and insights
from economics, finance, statistics, math, computer science, and engineering, combined with lots of data
(public and proprietary) to identify relationships that market participants may not have incorporated in the
price immediately. They build computer systems that generate trading signals based on these relationships,
perform portfolio optimization in light of trading costs, and trade using automated execution schemes that
route hundreds of orders every few seconds. In other words, trading is done by feeding data into computers
that run various programs with human oversight.”).
29
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Quantitative strategies can be broken down into simplified categories based on a
number of parameters, and the combination of parameters defines any particular
investment manager’s discretionary style or styles.32 The Center for International
Securities and Derivatives Markets uses an exhaustive list to classify fund strategies.33
However, these classifications are better attributed to specific asset class strategies
instead of the broader classifications of strategies generally (because strategies can be
applied across asset classes). The focus of this note is limited to Quantitative strategies
themselves, regardless of the asset class. In particular, the focus of this note revolves
around quantitative trading strategies with effects in the equity markets, under simplified
and generalized assumptions.34 This section details a number of the strategies as
background.

A.

Fundamental Assumptions

The tenants of contemporary finance theory extend far beyond the scope of the
discussion in this note, but the essentials are worth mentioning. Starting with Eugene
Fama’s Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH), the most basic premise of market efficiency
states that share prices reflect all available information about a given stock and, therefore,

32

Douglas Cumming & Sophia Johan, Symposium Article: Hedge Fund Forum Shopping, 10 U. PA. J. BUS.
& EMP. L. 783, 787 (2008) (“Hedge funds engage in a variety of investment activities. . . . [Compared to
other investment vehicles] the hedge fund is the most autonomous in its ability to implement its rather
innovative investment strategies.”); see also BOOKSTABER, at 245-246.
33
Cumming & Johan at 807-808. (“The Center for International Securities and Derivatives Markets
(‘CCISDM’) records styles for Merger Arbitrage, Equity Long/Short, Relative Value Multi-Strategy,
Emerging Markets, Equity Market Neutral, Multi-Strategy, Convertible Arbitrage, Global Macro, Fixed
Income, Fixed Income Arbitrage, Technology Sector, Event Driven Multi Strategy, Distressed Securities,
Option Arbitrage, Capital Structure Arbitrage, Market Timing, Short Bias, Equity Long Only, Regulation
D, Other Relative Value and Other Strategy.”).
34
PEDERSEN, at ; LO
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the price of that stock is accurate.35 When new information enters the market, prices
change almost instantaneously to reflect that new information.36 This can be further
broken down into the three current variations of the EMH: (1) Weak; (2) Semi-Strong;
and (3) Strong.37 The Weak from of the EMH states that a stock’s price is substantially
independent of past price performance.38 Historic price information is, thus, reflected in
the current price, so investors can derive no benefit from analyzing successive historic
prices.39
The Semi-strong EMH postulates an intermediate step, namely that current prices
are only a reflection of public knowledge about a security.40 Since that knowledge is
public, an investor’s efforts to acquire and analyze superior amounts of public
information cannot be expected to produce superior investment results.41 The Strongest
form of the EMH is the logical extreme. It posits that stock price reflects all public and
private information about that security. If all information is reflected in the price, it is
therefore impossible for an investor to systematically outperform the stock market.42
Since all information is taken into account, stock prices will therefore move in a
completely random walk, with past prices having no bearing on future prices.43 However,
as is laid out subsequently, EMH proves problematic in a real world application because

35

JOHN MACY, INTRODUCTION TO MODERN FINANCIAL THEORY at 38
Id.
37
Id.
38
MACY, at 39
39
Id.
40
Id.
41
Id.
42
Id.; But see also, Jack SCHWAGER, MARKET SENSE AND NONSENSE, HOW THE MARKETS REALLY WORK
(AND HOW THEY DON’T) at 13-14 (John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1st ed. 2013).
43
Id.
36
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there are frictions and inefficiencies.44 Those frictions and inefficiencies have produced
further theories as to price movement, and these inefficiencies are what sophisticated
investors are seeking to exploit.45
Quantitative investment managers reject that markets can be absolutely and
perfectly efficient.46 Instead, Quants seek to exploit temporary inefficiencies and price
anomalies resulting from less than perfectly efficient markets.47
Investment managers can further be categorized by parameters such as their time
horizon for trade executions and investment holding period.48 When predictive modeling
through complex algorithms notices price anomalies regarding specific securities, these
signals can be quickly arbitraged out of the market, bringing the price back to its true
value.49 From a quantitative perspective, these strategies are constructed to be market
neutral, meaning that they can profit no matter which direction the market swings,
positively or negatively.50
However, the fundamental assumptions and investment strategies, particularly
those espoused by pure Quants, showed a significant degree of overlap in their theories.51
Quant finance and an industry “of shared ideas because academics will publish studies of
price anomalies and will circulate them among the investment community. The

44

Id.
Id.
46
BRIAN BROWN, CHASING THE SAME SIGNALS, HOW BLACK-BOX TRADING INFLUENCES MARKETS FROM
WALL STREET TO SHANGHAI, at 53 (John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 2010).; See Daniel, infra note 52, at 20.
47
BROWN, at 41.
48 Daniel, at 12; BROWN, supra note 46, at 145; BELMONT, supra note 2, at 91.
49
LO, supra note 16, at 26.; Cahan & Yuo, infra note 92, at 1; BELMONT, supra note 2, at 185.
50 BROWN, supra note 46, at 78, 81; Khandani & Lo, supra note 4, at 2.
51
BROWN, supra note 46, at 164-165; See Quantcentration: Implications for Quantitative Equity Investing
(Quantitative Investment Strategies: Equity, Goldman Sachs Asset Management), Mar. 2008, at 1
45
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interesting ideas . . . will get digested throughout the industry and get implemented by
many different firms, although in slightly differentiated forms.”52 While the potential for
investment opportunity has expanded, fundamental assumptions have remained the same.

B.

Black Box Trading

As the previous sections details, the contemporary investment theory relies on a
specific set of underlying assumptions. Quantitative Finance has taken these
fundamentals, and applying theory with faster and more powerful computers, seen
unprecedented expansion in all aspects of investment strategy capacity.53 Technology has
expanded the capacity of data gathering and trade execution to level that is nearly
impossible for humans to do unaided.54 Firms expend significant resources to gain faster
access to data, then organize and store that data; some firms employing hundreds of
people for just that purpose.55 The trade execution speed, the volume of portfolio
turnover rates, and quantity securities involved in a strategy is a direct result of modern
technological advances.56
Colloquially known as “Black Box” trading, there is no precision definition of
what constitutes a “Black Box,” computer-drive quantitative investment strategy.57 The

52

BROWN, at 164-165.
LO, supra note 16, at 264; BELMONT, supra note 2, at 215.
54 LO, at 264.
55
NARANG, at 135; BROWN, supra note 50, at 10-11.
56 LO, supra note 16, at 264; NARANG, at 117; But see also, Lin, New Finance at 581. (“The accelerated
speed of cyborg finance means faster executions, faster market-making, and faster profits. But the
accelerated speed also means faster ascents and faster crashes at speeds previously unattainable, posing
challenges previously unimaginable.”);.”); BELMONT, supra note 2, at 216.
57
BROWN, supra note 46, at 9. (“A formal definition of ‘black-box strategy’ would be any trading system
that relies on an empirical model to generate the timing and quantity of investment decisions. The prerequisite for the black-box description is automation through computerized trading algorithms.”); See also,
53
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analogy of the Black Box pertains to the mystery surrounding how specific inputs are
converted into their relevant outputs.58 The most simplistic and formal definition is that a
Black Box strategy is a trading system that relies on empirical models and computers to
make decisions about the timing and quantity of trades and investments.59 Beyond the
implementation of the strategy, each Black Box strategy is engineered according to the
risk preferences and investment objectives of the designer.60 Inherent in that design are
the input triggers, or “signals,” that the models are making active decisions in response
to.61
However defined, quantitative investment managers are notoriously secretive and
protective of their alpha-generating strategies.62 Alpha (“”) is the secret magic that all
investment managers seek; it is an individual manager’s returns in excess of the market

Lin, New Finance at 574-575. (“In terms of trading, the emergence of computerization and artificial
intelligence has led to the rise of black-box or algorithmic trading, which refers to the use of incredibly
powerful computers to analyze and execute trading opportunities based on complex mathematical models.
In the age of cy-fi, almost every financial institution with significant capital employs some form of
algorithmic trading. These programs frequently operate exclusively on artificial intelligence, devoid of
human input after initial installation. These programs can process massive amounts of information, spot
trends, and allocate capital accordingly within seconds. In fact, some programs are so advanced that within
fractions of seconds of a securities filing or news report, the programs can ‘read’ them and execute trades
based on the new information without any human assistance. In the new financial industry, decisions that
previously took hours or minutes to analyze and execute by numerous teams of individuals now take only
seconds by a single computer.”); BELMONT, supra note 2, at 236, n. 23.
58
BROWN, supra note 46, at 9.; Pedersen, supra note 29, at 185.; BELMONT, at 215.
59
BROWN, at 32, 133.
60
BROWN, at 19; Daniel, supra note 48, at 11; David Easley et al., Opaque Trading, Disclosure, and Asset
Prices: Implications for Hedge Fund Regulation, 27 REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES 1190 (2014).
61
BROWN, at 19.
62
BROWN, at 9. (“A formal definition of ‘black-box strategy’ would be any trading system that relies on an
empirical model to generate the timing and quantity of investment decisions. The pre-requisite for the
black-box description is automation through computerized trading algorithms.”).
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overall.63 When one finds a way to generate Alpha, it must be jealously guarded. 64
Alpha is the measure that can make or break an investment manager, and it can slingshot
an investment strategy to rockstar status or straight to the graveyard.65 Developing an
alpha strategy that can consistently beat the market is no easy task, so quantitative
execution strategies are proprietary and often deemed trade secrets.66 Disclosure of any
proprietary strategy information contrary to the interests of investors and shareholders,
and directly a violation of the manager’s duty as a fiduciary.67 As trade secrets,
proprietary strategies are guarded with a secrecy and protection that borders on
paranoia.68 While alpha-drive returns may distinguish manager as individuals, it is more
difficult to distinguish them based on style alone because of the increased numbers of
multi-strategy investment managers.69 The next section addresses a surface level
assessment of Quant Equity investment strategies.

C.

An Overview of Specific Quantitative Strategies

Pederson, at 28. (“Expected return in excess of the risk free rate and the exposure to market is given by
the Alpha, .”); NARANG at 23-24; but see also, Martin, supra note 26 at 592; BELMONT, supra note 2, at
216.
63

LO, supra note 15, at 9; Martin, at 592; BELMONT, supra note 2, at 52.
PEDERSEN, at 28. (“Alpha is clearly the sexiest term in the regression: It is the Holy Grail all active
managers seek. Alpha measures the strategy’s value added above and beyond the market exposure due to
the hedge fund’s trading skill (or luck, given that alpha is estimated based on realized returns.)”).
66
Asness, Congressional testimony, supra note 26; LO, supra note 15, at 2. (“[M]any experts in intellectual
property law would certainly classify trading strategies, algorithms, and their software manifestations as
intellectual property which, in some cases, are patentable. However, most hedge fund managers today
(and, therefore, most investors) have not elected to protect such intellectual property through patents but
have chosen instead to keep them as ‘trade secrets,’ purposely limiting access to these ideas ever within
their own organizations. As a result, the departure of key personnel from a hedge fund often causes the
demise of the fund.”);.”); BELMONT, supra note 2, at 216.
67 LO, at 259; BOOKSTABER, supra note 14, at 201; See also, David Easley et al., supra note 65, at 1190.
68
LO, at 9; LO, at 3, n. 1; See also, Quantcentration, supra note 56, at 13; Robertson, supra note 25, at 794;
69 Ben-David et al., infra note 162, at 5; Brunnermeier & Pedersen, infra note 82, at 5.
64
65
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A Price Anomaly is “an irregularity or deviation from historical norms that recurs
in a data series.”70 What makes it anomalous is the fact that is by definition irregular.71
Detecting these irregularities allows the Quantitative investor to discern patterns in the
prices of securities; successful exploitation of those patterns can generate returns, or
alpha, above market returns.72 Any data that can be studied will be studied in order to
find original patterns.73 This runs some risk of over collecting data, or over-fitting models
to find patterns in noise that don’t actually exist.74 As technology has gotten faster and
more capable, Quants can now study market data in millisecond increments, trade by
trade or tick by tick.75 In these increments, computers can identify temporary imbalances
in supply and demand for a security and profit from them.76 Price anomalies become
trading signals when they are statistically significant deviations from the norm that will
be corrected.77 Some common indicators that can be used as input signals are price
volatility, bid-ask spread and trade volume.78

1.

Market Neutral

Funds that seek market neutrality are seeking to balance their portfolios, often
using long positions to offset short positions, so that the fund can generate profitable

70

BROWN, supra note 46, at 12.
Id., at 15.
72
Id. Id.; BELMONT, supra note 2, at 91, 215
73
Id.
74
RISHI NARANG, INSIDE THE BLACK BOX: A SIMPLE GUIDE TO QUANTITATIVE AND HIGH-FREQUENCY
TRADING, at 28, 139-144 (John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2nd ed. 2012).
75
BROWN, supra note 46, at 12, 27, 63.
76
BROWN at 14, 41, 54; M.K. Brunnermeier & L.H. Pedersen, Market Liquidity and Funding Liquidity, 22
REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES 2201 (2009).
77
BROWN at 14.
78
Id.
71
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returns regardless of which direction the market moves.79 The portfolio is constructed to
be “neutral” in dollar terms, with equally weighted long and short positions offsetting
each other.80 Arguably the truest definition of a Hedge, Market Neutral positions bet on
the market moving in both directions, and stand to gain profits from all movement.81
Market Neutral funds are notable because they can generate profits even while the entire
market collapses overall.82
Strategies extend beyond holding portfolios equally weighted in long and short
positions.83 Often these portfolios consist of hundreds or thousands of stocks.84 For a
strategy to be profitable, gains must simply exceed hedged losses; when this approach is
applied on a large scale, incremental gains can accumulate quickly, regardless of the
market environment.85

2.

Statistical Arbitrage

One of the most common Quant Strategies is Statistical Arbitrage (“Stat Arb"), or
Price-Mean Reversion.86 Stat Arb is a directional, trend following strategy that seeks to

79

BROWN, at 76; BELMONT, supra note 2, at 185.
Equal weighting offers protection against adverse movements and market corrections. BROWN at 76.
81 BROWN, at 76-78; BELMONT, supra note 2, at 186.
82 Id.
83
Id., at 10.
84
Id., at 77; DIXON ET. AL, supra note 2, at 25.
85 BROWN, supra note 46, at 81.
86
BROWN at 9, (“[Statistical Arbitrage] models attempt to exploit price anomalies in correlated securities.
They typically are nondirectional [sic] (therefore the term arbitrage[sic])in that they buy one security and
sell another, hoping to profit on the difference between the price margins of the directional positions.”); See
also, NARANG at 31, 33, (“The Theory behind mean reversion strategies is that there exists a center of
gravity around which prices fluctuate, and it is possible to identify both this center of gravity and what
fluctuation is sufficient to warrant making a trade. . . .[This capitalizes] short-term imbalances among
buyers and sellers due simply to liquidity requirements that lead to an instrument being over-bought or
over-sold.”).
80

14

anticipate the future momentum of stock prices.87 Statistical Arbitrage measures
temporary imbalances in the order book, or a mismatch of the number of buyers and the
number of sellers of a security, and anticipates that prices will return to their historical
mean when balance is restored.88 The most common notion of Stat Arb seeks to exploit
anomalies in the price differences between two correlated securities.89 Mean reversion
strategies can commonly be thought of as two, single equities that should correlate, but
are temporarily uncorrelated.90 Stat Arb strategies buy the security deemed undervalued,
while simultaneously shorting the corresponding security that is overvalued.91 These
opportunities arise when two securities that should be priced with an expected
correlation, but due to temporary anomalies in the market, the prices have diverged from
their equilibrium correlation.92
A classic Stat Arb example would involve two similar securities, such as Coke
and Pepsi or General Motors and Chrysler.93 Stat Arb strategies monitor the margin of
difference between the prices of the securities.94 If that margin increases or decreases to a
statistically significant deviation from the mean of the historical margin, a Stat Arb
strategy will take action by betting that the prices will revert to the historical mean once

87

BROWN, at 56; BELMONT, supra note 2, at 186-187.
BROWN, at 54.
89 Id.
90
BROWN, supra note 46, at 10; See also LO, supra note 16, at 4 (“It is one of the great lessons of modern
finance that mean-variance optimization yields benefits through diversification, the ability to lower
volatility for a given level of expected return by combing securities that are not perfectly correlated. But
what is the securities are hedge funds, and which if their correlations change over time.”).
91
BROWN at 9.
92
Id.
93 BROWN, at 56.
94 Id.
88
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the anomaly has been corrected.95 The time horizon for Stat Arb can range from a few
seconds to several months.96

IV.

COMPETITIVE INVESTOR PHENOMENON RESULTING

FROM PUBLIC DISCLOSURE
A.

Systemic Risk As a Result of Disclosure

Quarterly disclosure places portfolio holdings in the public domain, accessible by
anyone through the Commission’s EDGAR filing database.97 When portfolio structure
and specific equity holdings are made public, Quant funds are tipping their hands by
revealing pieces of their proprietary strategies and alpha generating techniques.98 For
Long Short funds, public disclosure reveals their sentiments on individual companies,
industries, sectors, instruments and the global economy as whole.99 Any correlated
equities correspond to a relationship the fund is seeking to exploit for gain. Thus, their
proprietary strategies are made public knowledge, and the reasons for the specific
holdings can be readily discerned by the astute investor.100
This disclosure creates a severe risk of copy cats of all varieties: from new
investment managers and new funds seeking to emulate, if not completely duplicate,
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Critical to successful intraday statistical arbitrage is being able to distinguish noise trading from
“informed” trading. BROWN at 57.
96
NARANG, at 31; See also, Pedersen, supra note 29, at 185.
97 13F filings can be found at the SEC’s Edgar Database website, available at
https://www.sec.gov/edgar/searchedgar/companysearch.html (last visited March 27, 2016).
98
LO, supra note 16, at 121; Easley et al., supra note 65, at 1191.
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Martin, supra note 26, at 592.
100 Easley et al., supra note 65, at 1191.

16

successful tactical strategies, to established industry players seeking to expand the scope
and size of their own funds both inside and outside of their tradition asset class
strategy.101 For fund managers that already hold substantial assets, this copy-cat
expansion can mean venturing into new markets and asset classes, or doubling down on
already implemented equities-based strategies using amplified leverage.102
This note has thus far attempted to demonstrate said underpinnings. This note
further argues that 13(f) disclosures are problematic for a number of reasons, and the
risks associated with disclosure create substantial systemic risk, arguably in excess of
their substantive merit.103 The following sections contain an overview of the risks
inherent with public disclosure. These sections simply define the phenomena that occur
when multiple investors pursue the same strategy.104 The risks this note identifies are,
respectively, Clone Fund Risk, Copycats, The Crowded Trade Effect, The Decay Effect,
Leverage and Style Drift. After these risks have been defined, the effect they have on the
financial system and the practical outcomes from unexpected events are explained in the
section that follows.

B.

Clone Funds

When portfolio positions are disclosed publicly, that information creates an
additional data set that other investment managers can use to compare their own
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Daniel, supra note 52, at 11.
When investment managers begin cannibalizing each others’ profits, they must increase leverage to
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103 LO, at 211.
104 Pedersen, supra note 29, at 184.; Easley et al., supra note 94, at 1191.
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strategies.105 Using sophisticated computers and common risk factors, sophisticated
investment managers can replicate the portfolio returns of other active managers.106
Investment managers can thus create “clones” that replicate specific fund
characteristics.107 The simplest clone is a low-cost passive portfolio subject to similar risk
exposures.108 The ease of cloning depends on to what degree a specific fund’s return is
driven by common risk factors versus manager-specific alpha; the former being easier to
clone while the latter being more difficult.109 However, linear clones based on common
risk metrics can generate returns similar to the funds on which they are based, meaning
that “hedge fund replication, at least for certain types of funds, is both possible and, in
some cases, worthy of serious consideration.”110 Complex cloning is still in its infancy
with financial engineering academics.111 But, experts have shown it is possible to achieve
comparable returns to actual funds using a cloning process that “reverse-engineers a
hedge fund’s proprietary trading strategy, thereby profiting from the fund’s intellectual
property.”112

C.

The Crowded Trade
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LO, at 121.
Id.
107 Id. Id; Ben-David et al., supra note 42, at 7.
108 Id., at 121-122.
109 Id.
110 The strategies that can be cloned most precisely are Equity Market Neutral, Global Marco, Long/Short
Equity Hedge, Managed Futures, Multi-Strategy, and Funds of Funds. LO, at 122.
111 LO, at 165.
112 LO, at 165.
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A Crowded Trade is the term for a strategy that has maximized its potential
returns.113 A strategy becomes crowded when returns on that strategy are diminished
because opportunities to profitably implement the strategy have been similarly
diminished.114 What results is that quant firms become price setters, at which point
crowding can cause prices to severely overshoot fair values, and expected returns
diminish or completely reverse very rapidly.115 When a strategy becomes crowded, it is
generally the result of either two causes: (1) the strategy has been recognized as
profitable, and then copied and implemented by numerous investors; or (2) a single
investor has assets that have grown to exceed the total opportunities to pursue a strategy,
essentially crowding oneself out of a trade.116
Investors that copy the strategies of innovators are simply trend followers, but are
deemed “copycats” because they have copied the profitable trading strategy. 117 What
constitutes copying varies and does not necessarily mean cloning.118 Copying can be
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Quantcentration, at 5. (“[In the Crowded Trade], information decays more rapidly and managers now
must hold smaller positions and trade out of these positions much more quickly, or they run the risk of
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CHINCARINI, supra note 1, at 1 (“[P]ortfolio managers create innovation. This innovation usually makes
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innovators, because other buy more and more of their trades. These copycats create a side effect however:
They crowd the space. The strategy’s future returns depend increasingly on the copycats behavior.”); But
see also, Rochester Cahan & Yin Luo, Standing Out From the Crowd: Measuring Crowding in
Quantitative Strategies, 39 JOURNAL OF PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT 14, at 15 (2013); David Easley et al.,
Opaque Trading, Disclosure, and Asset Prices: Implications for Hedge Fund Regulation, 27 Review of
Financial Studies 1190, at 1192 (2014).
115 Quantcentration: Implications for Quantitative Equity Investing (Quantitative Investment Strategies:
Equity, Goldman Sachs Asset Management), Mar. 2008, at 3.; See Daniels, supra note 54, at 12.
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LO, at 16. (“As assets under management increase, it becomes progressively more difficult for fund
managers to implement strategies that are truly uncorrelated with broad-based market indexes.”); see
CHINCARINI., at 200.; Easley et al., supra note 94, at 1191.
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CHINCARINI, supra note 85, at 1.
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both intentional and unintentional.119 All quant managers use similar factors as signals in
their alpha models.120 Astute traders can quickly pick up on proprietary factors, because
of their similarity.121 Furthermore, their risk modeling and transaction cost optimization
factors are also constructed in a naturally similar fashion.122 A naturally optimized
portfolio “leads to professional quant portfolios that are concentrated in a few hundred
similar stocks. Many of these stocks likely appear across many portfolios.”123
Overcrowding is a significant problem for hedge funds that can rapidly shift assets in and
out of different markets.124 If a fund is having significant success with a specific strategy
that is very profitable, it will draw more funds and more managers to that strategy, or
attract increased investor allocations to the strategy. 125 When a strategy becomes
crowded, “[t]he increases in managers and assets in a strategy will reduce profit margins,
as there is more competition for the same trades, and will increase losses during
liquidation phases.”126 The phenomenon runs in tandem with the decay effect, addressed
in the next section.

D.

The Decay Effect

A strategy is said to have experienced “Decay” when the returns on that strategy
results in steadily declining returns over time.127 The time period over which this
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reduction occurs is relative to the time horizon of the strategy or the horizon in which
alpha returns are evaluated.128 Regardless of time, the repeated implementation of the
strategy results in diminishing returns, and the measure of an individual manager’s alpha
then declines.129 This Decay is the effect of many firms employing similar strategies, in
turn reducing profit margins to fractions of previous time measures.130
The reason for the decay is less relevant than the diminishing alpha returns.
Managers must achieve benchmark returns in order to satisfy investors, and those returns
must be consistent. When alpha decays from a strategy, that leads managers to
implement different strategies, either through alternative investment avenues or amplified
leverage.131

E.

Leverage

Once a strategy has been crowded out or the returns have decayed, funds have
few options to continue realizing returns on par with historical averages.132 Particularly,
if a crowded strategy had been an original innovation, that strategy must find alternative
ways to eek out returns in the crowded space.133 Any options the fund manager uses,
while is quite normal as an investment strategy, can cause catastrophic externalities when
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unexpected events occur.134 Implementing leverage is a single option choice that
exacerbates both positive and negative returns.135
One option is to add leverage to the fund to the fund to amplify returns. Simply
defined, leverage is the market value or all positions held by the fund, both long and
short, divided by the fund’s equity capital.136 Leverage is the classic double edged sword;
in good times, it can generate returns multiple times those possible with the face value of
the collateral, but when shocks and unexpected events occur, leverage can magnify losses
in the same fashion.137 This danger of severe leverage in one asset class is that it can have
problematic effects in other, unrelated asset classes.138
Another alternative is to invest in alternate strategies. Divergence from a core
strategy, or “Style Drift,” discussed in the next section, is always a risky endeavor.139
Asset managers are safest using investment strategies they are familiar with. When using
new strategies to true and boost returns, funds can make decisions that are rooted in a less
than thorough understanding of the investment strategy.140

F.

Strategy Divergence and “Style Drift”
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When fund managers venture into new and unfamiliar asset classes (or markets),
the effect is that of them plotting a course for unknown waters.141 When sophisticated
investors experience “Style Drift” further and further from their central understanding,
the risk of poor or uninformed investment choices amplifies.142 When significant assets
are thrown behind a vaguely understood strategy, the systemic risk can be utterly
catastrophic.143
The divergence into exotic or highly specialized financial instruments is a
signature of hedge fund investing, be it advertent or not.144 These markets can often
contain relatively few buyers and sellers, and are thus considered “Thin.”145 Liquidity in
such thin markets can rapidly disappear, which causes steep declines in asset prices when
a fund decides or is forced to sell.146 When those asset prices decline, funds holding
similar assets feel the negative price pressure on their own holdings.147 If assets that are
used as collateral for employing leverage experience this price decline, credit quickly
dries up and financial panic ensues.148
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142
EFFICIENTLY INEFFICIENT, at 72. (When a growing hedge fund “. . . .starts to diversify into more and
more different strategies. . . .the expected paper return may start to decline as the hedge fund starts
diversifying into markets and trading strategies where it lacks expertise, a behavior call ‘style drift’”).
143
For a comprehensive account of catastrophic strategy divergence and the implosion of Long Term
Capital Management, see WHEN GENIUS FAILED, Roger Lowenstein.
144
DIXON ET AL., supra note 15, at 28.
145
Id.
146
Id.; Brunnermeier & Pedersen, supra note 82, at 4-5; BELMONT, supra note 2, at 3, 50.
147 LO, at 201; BELMONT, supra note 2, at 103.
148 Id. (arguing that the withdrawal of credit forces liquidation of large positions in declining assets,
sending panic across investors.); Ben-David et. al., supra note 42, at 4-5; BELMONT, supra note 2, at 103.

23

Long Term Capital Management (LTCM) presents a textbook, albeit tragic, case
study of the consequence of misguided diversification. LTCM’s ultimate liquidation was
a result of issues that defied their computer modeling.149 By employing significant
leverage in seemingly diversified—yet correlated—investment strategies, LTCM not
only blew themselves up, but threatened to topple the whole financial system in their
wake.150 If copycats see that a certain fund has a successful record, and take their
disclosed holdings to reverse engineer a copycat strategy, the increased volume of assets
held under that strategy can create severe systemic risk.

V.

EXPERT OPINION AND THE RISK OF CONTAGION
Systemic risk has many names in academia, each being provocative to a varying

degree. The phenomenon of crowding in quantitative strategy has been dubbed
“Quantcentration” by one prominent report.151 Portfolio and Investment risk that results
from others holding a similar portfolio is now known as “Contagion” or “Common
Investor” Risk.152 This risk is characterized by 2 parts. The first part concerns how
crowded the specific quant strategy is. The second part relates to what other instruments
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and positions are held by competing investors and how those holdings could force them
to exit the quant strategy in a hurried panic.153
This simultaneous panic and exit risk has been dubbed by one expert as “The
ATM Effect.”154 The ATM Effect is the result of a flight to liquidity; liquid assets are
sold off to cover the risk exposure of less liquid or completely illiquid holdings.155 The
specifics of the process will be detailed in the next section. But, in essence, good, liquids
strategies are exited to raise cash to cover the losses of bad, illiquid strategies.156 This
strategy can be swift and painful for any number of counterparts, but the firm that is
liquidating exacerbates its harm if it is simultaneously delivering.157 Leveraged firms will
exert additional harm on counterparties in their efforts to meet their obligations.158
These types of liquidity events are characterized by an irrational paradox: a credit
crisis leading to illiquidity in credit instruments sparks a forced sale of more liquid assets
that had nothing to do with the credit crisis.159 August 2007 can be attributed to a variety
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of driving forces.160 Most concerning for our purposes, is the widespread proliferation of
quantitative long-short equity strategies.161 Another important factor is the practice multistrategy funds cross-collateralizing many strategies against each other.162 When credit
becomes tight, these cross-collateralized credit strategies become illiquid, and more
liquid quant based equity strategies must be liquidated to raise cash during a crunch.163

A.

Liquidity Spirals and the Gambler’s Ruin

Doubling down on leverage to increase volumes in holdings exacerbates the risk
that market movements can spark liquidity spirals.164 When combined with crowded trade
and style drift, the results of adverse market movement can be catastrophic.165 Distinct
from traditional forms of investment risk, “Funding Liquidity Risk” is the risk that
adverse price movements can evaporate liquidity when prices are uncertain.166 Liquidity
Risk is the risk of a situation “in which too many funds have set up the same trades and
may not be able to exit their positions quickly. In such a case, prices may overreact, and
liquidity may fall sharply.”167
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Liquidity risk is exacerbated most when a fund is holding illiquid positions.168
The risk arises when these illiquid positions must be promptly and aggressively
liquidated, most often at a large loss.169 The instant need for liquidity, or the motivation
to sell illiquid positions at a loss, can stem from the Fund’s desire to exit positions it no
longer has confidence in, or to meet sudden investor redemptions or creditor margin
calls.170 Since illiquid markets most often correlate to with Thin markets, steep price
declines result from a dearth of buyers.171 Liquidity risk reaps the most damage to the
market at the most inopportune times.172
The paradox of the gambler’s ruin, is that position unwinding is forced at times
when investment opportunities are particularly good.173 Downward pressure from one
fund unwinding a significant position puts forced pressure on other investors—through
margin calls, depressed asset values and tactical portfolio rebalancing or forced fire
sales—to similarly unwind positions in a depressed market, further depressing prices and
causing others to sell, creating an adverse feedback loop.174 A particular liquidity spiral

periods, resulting in especially wide bid/ask spreads, and extracting a large penalty from those forced to
liquidate.”).; accord Rothman, infra note 157, at 8.
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of note, the 2007 “Quant Quake, ” is detailed in the next section. Liquidity spirals can
function upwards as much as they can function downwards.175 Upward Liquidity Spirals
are prevalent during times of cheap credit and high return investments, permissibly
incentivizing the use of leverage and exotic financial instruments.176
Unexpected drivers of large swings in equity prices can diverge significantly from
traditional quantitative expectations.177 Particularly significant price swings can cause
ripple effect disruptions in alternative markets that funds have similar positions in.178

B.

August 2007

The first week of August 2007 was ultimately the precursor to the mortgage
meltdown of 2008, but it was an unforeseen and devastating event for quantitative
investment managers.179 These quantitative investors hit the hardest where Market
Neutral and Stat Arb funds focused on exchange traded equities, funds that by definition
and construction have minimal beta exposure and immunity from market gyrations. 180
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Even more remarkable that the laserlike hemorrhaging and losses were concentrated
almost entirely on model-drive quant funds positioned long/short in equity.181
Colloquially referred to by experts as the “Quant Quake” or the “Quant Crisis,” the first
week of August 2007 saw unanticipated market movements on a colossal scale.182
The market events of August 2007 have come to signify the epitome of
interrelated quantitative strategies simultaneously reversing.183 Against all predictions,
models and trends, portfolio holdings that were determined by widely accepted
quantitative theory simultaneously acted inapposite to both meticulously constructed
models, as well as quantitative theories’ common sense market movement
expectations.184
Not only does this simultaneous market unwinding suggest that the financial
sector is unexpectedly interrelated and commonly correlated, but it suggests begets a
much more surprising and worrisome conclusion.185 Investment strategy overlap and
market-neutral portfolio correlation extend much further beyond superficially accepted
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portfolio observations.186 The “Quant Quake” of 2007 suggests that investment and
portfolio management theory creates a much larger and more disconcerting issue of
portfolio based systemic risk.187 When a single or multi strategy fund must deleverage a
liquid asset to meet margin calls for a less liquid asset, the value of liquid asset holdings
decreases in direct relation with the speed than a manager aggressively liquidates. 188
A single strategy investor deleveraging a portfolio can have minimal effect on the
overall market; such market impact can be virtually unnoticeable to the greater market,
particularly on volume heavy or momentum intensive days.189 However, systemic market
impact as a result of price impact in multiple asset classes can occur as a result of triggers
that are seemingly uncorrelated.190
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August 2007 triggered by adverse market movement in asset classes with no
apparent correlation, dragging down aggregate portfolios for many investment
managers.191 When an aggregate portfolio experience negative pressure based on a
portfolio of completely unrelated assets in a diversified strategy, unforeseen
consequences arise.192 While deleveraging one asset portfolio to met the margin calls
required of another, anti-trend or contra momentum result of the sell off can run amok of
the conventional models that anticipate momentum and movement based on the input
parameters.193 When the models begin to recognize anomalies within the market
movement parameters, every investor—people and computers—see the prices and
liquidity moving contrary to expectations.194 What follows is each of these investors
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liquidates their portfolio reduce exposure and stem the bleeding lest it become one
monetary hemorrhage of spiraling value drain upon the then-present portfolio
positioning.195
Systemic implication results from when investment strategy overlaps by using
active tactical strategies; strategies that draw off of investment in overlapping batches of
securities.196 If a fund is to maintain truly market neutral in their comprehensive
investment strategy, there must be equities that are seemingly in favor with a
contravening reversion anticipation, and equities which assume the antithetical position
within any given portfolio.197 When these reversion strategies, or anticipatory contrarian
strategies, all act in unison, they push asset prices out of equilibria.198
August 2007 is a direct result of several multi-strategy funds and bank proprietary
trading desks deleveraging their portfolios in response to poor performance of credit
oriented strategies.199 Fund Managers were forced to sell of their long equity positions in

Lin, New Finance at 588 (“Automated programs operating at warp speeds can exacerbate volatility and
reduce liquidity during periods of tumult by eliminating trading positions in the marketplace.”); accord
Cahan & Yuo, supra note 92, at 19.; Daniels, supra note 55, at 16.
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Pedersen, supra note 29, at 185. (“[I]n a standard Markowitz/CAPM world, all investors are holding
exactly the same portfolio, namely the “tangency” portfolio with the highest risk-adjusted return. While
real-world traders are far more diverse than this theoretical benchmark since they use different methods to
estimate risk and expected return, it is natural to expect that at least the most sophisticated traders in a
specific market have some overlap in their portfolios since they are striving toward the same goal.”); but
see also, Cahan & Yuo, supra note 92, at 18.
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market moves. For a truly Beta neutral portfolio, market neutral excess return = 𝑅𝓉ℯ − 𝛽𝑅𝓉𝑀,𝔢 = 𝛼 + 𝜀𝓉 .
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order to cover their shorts.200 The result was significant market impact.201 What were held
as long positions saw violent price declines, while short positions say massive price
gains.202 That any firm holding a quantitative long short strategy saw portfolio divergence
to unexpected levels, and this adverse performance resulted in significant portfolio
losses.203 As losses accrue, fund managers must continue to liquidate at the worst time,
and the liquidity crisis spirals as an adverse feedback loop.204 This negative adverse
feedback loop, impacting only quantitative value strategies, defied any predictable
modeling or previous market behavior.205
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VI.

INCREASED CONFIDENTIALITY TO REMEDY

DISCLOSURE RISKS
Section I lays out a brief overview of the Form 13F confidentiality provisions and
when they are available to qualifying investment managers.206 As mentioned supra, while
confidential treatment is possible, in practice, only a select few managers satisfy the
stringent qualifications to be granted this treatment.207 The investment community has
voiced concern over the lack of confidentiality and its risks to sensitive and proprietary
investment strategies.208 Sections IV and V have detailed the risks that result from
disclosure and the risks to the health of the overall financial system.209 This section
argues that broadening the qualifications that can be afforded confidential treatment
serves as a remedy for the risks attendant in the current disclosure paradigm.
The broadest category of qualified filings are those from investment managers
“identifying securities held by the account of a natural person or an estate or trust,”
excepting those held by a business trust or an investment company.210 The form instructs
managers seeking confidential treatment to “provide enough factual support for its
request to enable the Commission to make an informed judgment as to the merits of the
request.”211 This discretionary standard leaves vast discretion to the Commission to
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decide whether or not a filing qualifies for discretionary treatment, without specifying
when a claim is determined meritorious. However, the form instructs filers to describe
any applicable conditions from a set listed on the form, to assist in their determination of
confidential status.212
Paragraph 2 instructs that managers claiming the subject information “is
confidential, commercial or financial information” to provide information detailed in
paragraphs 2(a) through 2(e); the instruction does contain a small qualification in
paragraph 2(f) for managers holding open risk arbitrage positions.213 Paragraph 2(a) first
requires the manager to describe the specific securities holdings that are subject to the
acquisition and disposition through the manager’s investment strategy.214 Once described,
paragraph 2(b) instructs the manager to describe why public disclosure would be likely to
reveal the investment strategy; but this instruction is qualified by a strict limitation that
the filer must consider the request “in light of the specific reporting requirements of Form
13F, (e.g., securities holdings are reported only quarterly and may be aggregated in many
cases).215 Thus, the onus is with the filer to prove the sensitivity of the information, in
light of the presupposition that the Form 13F requirements are already structured with a
significant degree of leniency.216 A facial reading suggests that the Commission considers
the filing requirements sufficiently lenient, without regard for the sensitivity of the
individual investment strategy.
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Paragraph 2(c) further requires that the manager prove that revealing the
information is “premature,” in light of whether the security is being traded both at the
close of the quarter and at the time of the filing, and whether the investment strategy is
already known to the public.217 The term “premature” is defined only to include securities
traded within that narrow window between the close of the quarter and the filing, with
any other securities seemingly unqualified. Whether or not an investment strategy is
known to the public, and to what degree, is an unclear definition and offers no guidance
as to what to that means, giving broad discretion to the Commission in its determination
of “otherwise known to the public.”218
Most troublesome is paragraph 2(d), that managers must:
Demonstrate that failure to grant the request for confidential treatment
would be likely to cause substantial harm to the Manager’s competitive
position; show what use competitors could make of the information and
how harm to the manager could ensue.219
This requirement imposes both a substantially high burden of proof on manager, that of
showing substantial harm, and a detailed explanation of exactly how a competitor can use
the information for their own benefit.220 As I have explained in previous sections, there
are a multitude of ways that competitors can use information for their own benefit, to the
detriment of the manager.221 With the multitude of disclosure risks possible, the result is
significant risk of harm to both the fiduciaries of the manager, and the system as a
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whole.222 Overlapping positions, coupled with the cross collateralization of assets, can
send violent shocks across markets and spread contagion through the system.
While open risk arbitrage positions constitute a limited allowance for potential
confidential treatment, the exception is similarly small. Only securities held in an open
position on the last eligible filing day constitute protected securities.223 Qualified
securities are further limited to positions that the manager reasonably believes will not be
closed out between the close of the quarter and the last eligible filing date.224 Within the
broad realm of strategic merger arbitrage and its inherent contingencies (such as bidding
wars, deal collapse, macro economic shifts, etc.) these limited exceptions do not offer
significant opportunities for confidential treatment.
Enhancing the ability for investment managers to attain confidential status
recognizes the value of a proprietary trade secret, while not adversely affecting the
Commission’s ability to analyze and compile data about the market.225 Prominent fund
managers have voiced their support of enhanced disclosure obligations, and a willingness
to engage regulators more, so long as that disclosure remains privately held by the
regulators.226 The current disclosure paradigm creates serious systemic risk when
competing investment managers with overlapping portfolios must respond to unexpected
events. Sensible changes to the regulation can have the threefold benefit of empowering
regulators through enhanced disclosures, protect strategies for the benefit of the
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investment manager and their investors, and reduce the contagion effects of unexpected
events.227 Much like the relationship between the US Banks and the Office of the
Comptroller of Currency, it is possible to collect and analyze extensive hedge fund data
in the same fashion, while protecting the confidentiality of the parties involved.228

VII.

CONCLUSION
It is not easy task for regulators to balance the proprietariness of investment

strategies against the need for disclosure. Disclosure serves a vital purpose in informing
both the regulators and the public about risks and returns that individual funds produce.
However, disclosure is also beset by negative externalities that can have serious
consequences on the health of the overall financial system. When positions are made
public through disclosure, it is more than just the regulators that become privy to a
specific fund’s investment strategy. For sophisticated and competitive investment
managers, having access to portfolio information can allows one manager to clone or
copy the investment strategies of another. When multiple funds align portfolios with
copied positions, any shock to the system can send ripples across markets and asset
classes. However, this risk can be remedied simply and sensibly. Regulatory disclosure
can still serve its purpose to apprise regulators of institutional risk without being made
public. By requiring the same amount, if not more information from funds, but assuring it
is kept confidential by the regulator, systemic copycat risk can be significantly curbed.
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VIII.

APPENDIX A: REGULATION TEXT:
§ 240.13f–1 Reporting by institutional investment managers of information with

respect to accounts over which they exercise investment discretion.

(a)(1) Every institutional investment manager which exercises investment
discretion with respect to accounts holding section 13(f) securities, as defined in
paragraph (c) of this section, having an aggregate fair market value on the last trading day
of any month of any calendar year of at least $100,000,000 shall file a report on Form
13F (§ 249.325 of this chapter) with the Commission within 45 days after the last day of
such calendar year and within 45 days after the last day of each of the first three calendar
quarters of the subsequent calendar year.
(2) An amendment to a Form 13F (§ 249.325 of this chapter) report, other than
one reporting only holdings that were not previously reported in a public filing for the
same period, must set forth the complete text of the Form 13F. Amendments must be
numbered sequentially.
(b) For the purposes of this rule, “investment discretion” has the meaning set forth
in section 3(a)(35) of the Act (15 U.S.C. 78c(a)(35)). An institutional investment
manager shall also be deemed to exercise “investment discretion” with respect to all
accounts over which any person under its control exercises investment discretion.
(c) For purposes of this rule “section 13(f) securities” shall mean equity securities
of a class described in section 13(d)(1) of the Act that are admitted to trading on a
national securities exchange or quoted on the automated quotation system of a registered
securities association. In determining what classes of securities are section 13(f)
39

securities, an institutional investment manager may rely on the most recent list of such
securities published by the Commission pursuant to section 13(f)(4) of the Act (15 U.S.C.
78m(f)(4)). Only securities of a class on such list shall be counted in determining whether
an institutional investment manager must file a report under this rule (§ 240.13f–1(a)) and
only those securities shall be reported in such report. Where a person controls the issuer
of a class of equity securities which are “section 13(f) securities” as defined in this rule,
those securities shall not be deemed to be “section 13(f) securities” with respect to the
controlling person, provided that such person does not otherwise exercise investment
discretion with respect to accounts with fair market value of at least $100,000,000 within
the meaning of paragraph (a) of this section.229
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